[Enigmail] Default encryption key.
Robert J. Hansen
rjh at sixdemonbag.org
Mon Jun 2 15:10:25 PDT 2008
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First, let me start off by agreeing with John. This is an error in some
documentation. My remarks are additions, not disagreements.
| Obscuring key IDs serves little purpose for security though it does
| hinder folks from pointing out obvious errors.
And, in a larger sense, it's a security diminishment. It seems that
most people who throw key IDs do so out of some thought that it makes
them more secure, more confidential, more... more /something/, but
without a clearly defined security threat and throwing key IDs as a
clearly articulated response to that threat.
This is a bigger problem than just throwing key IDs. Pretty much
everything in GnuPG is the same way. People want to tweak the system
for the "best" security profile without first establishing a threat
model. It just doesn't work that way. Throwing a bunch of features
that "feel right" at the problem is unlikely to do anything except make
the user feel good and thus lull them into a false sense of security.
For years I've said GnuPG is too large a software package for my liking.
I would like it an awful lot if GnuPG supported only 3DES for sending
symmetric traffic, only DSA1024/2048 for signature algorithms, only
ElG2048 for asymmetric crypto, and only SHA1/SHA256 for digests.
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Version: GnuPG v1.4.6 (GNU/Linux)
Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org
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